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INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to undertake a broad analysis of the desirability or otherwise 
of instituting competition law in Zimbabwe and an analysis of the Act itself in an endeavour 
to ascertain whether or not technically it is good law. For one to effectively discharge this 
mandate it is essential that one starts with a broad overview of competition and antitrust 
policies and legislation in order to ascertain an ideal structure within which such a policy 
can be adopted for Zimbabwe. To this end a brief analysis of the Zimbabwean economic 
structure is essential in order to illustrate the flaws in that structure which would have to 
be combated by a competition law. It is also necessary to look at what can be considered to 
be generally acceptable characteristics of effective competition law. It is only after this has 
been done that one can specifically evaluate the enacted legislation. It will therefore be 
necessary before rendering judgement on the Act to undertake a comparative study of 
similar legislation in other countries with the objective of borrowing from the strengths of 
other legislation governing different jurisdictional entities. Interviews were conducted with 
various interest groups with a view to ascertaining the different perceptions of the new 
law.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
After the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Rhodesian Front Government in 
1965 the international community responded by imposing an arms embargo and economic 
sanctions. The Rhodesian economy became isolated and with the exception of occasional 
sanction busting plots and the South African Trade Lifeline, the main thrust became one of 
internal self-sufficiency. This entailed the promotion of massive import substitution 
programmes. The economy was characterized by the existence of major monopolies and 
the market itself was generally characterized by want of competition internally and 
externally. Even though economic sanctions were lifted at independence in 1980 the 
complexion of the economic structure did not change. The government then was flirting 
with marxian economic theories and the commandist character of the economy inherited 
from the Rhodesian Front era might have had its appeal. Right up to 1991 one can summarize 
the Zimbabwean economy as one characterized by general lethargy, antiquated capital 
equipment, huge budget deficits, foreign currency shortages, government sponsored 
monopolies and the usual consequences of lack of competition and monopolist structures 
such as general shortages, arbitrary prices and compromised quality. However, from October 
1990 the government, in an attempt to resuscitate the economy, embarked on an IMF and 
World Bank sponsored Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). In brief the 
thrust of this programme was the opening up of the economy to outside competition through 
a trade liberalization programme and structural adjustments of the economy itself in order 
to encourage internal competition.
THE ROLE OF LAW IN TRANSFORMING THE ECONOMY
The legal regime defines the market structure which exists in a country at each and every 
given period. The maintenance of a closed economy, for instance, entails the maintenance
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of a stiff tariff regime, strict exchange control regulations and creation of public monopolies 
in essential aspects of economic activity. Similarly, the transition to a market economy can 
only be sustained by the repeal of restrictive laws and the promulgation of laws which 
promote entry and competition. Since the institution of ESAP in 1990 we have seen statutes 
being amended to allow competition. For example the removal of restrictive foreign 
exchange regulations; the erosion of price controls and the amendment of laws to erode 
monopolies and encourage competition for instance in the Dairy industry and the urban 
public transport sector. The proposed Competition law therefore is a natural and inescapable 
progression in the transformation of the economy from a command economy to a market 
economy. It is a trend which is evident for instance in the countries of Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union where competition laws have become an integral aspect of the 
transformation process. The same trend is evident in African countries undergoing reform 
such as Kenya. It is however, important, to comprehend the fact that competition, once it 
has been introduced, has to be nurtured since it cannot on its own maintain itself. The 
natural tendency is for enterprises to expand into technological and organisational giants 
and to monopolize the means of production. To avoid this therefore, even in advanced 
market economies, there is always a need to maintain viable competition laws which act as 
watchdogs. It is for this reason that technologically advanced market economies such as 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany have varying types of 
competition laws.
Competition laws, usually referred to as anti-trust laws, come in various forms and it is 
important to draw the various distinctions before looking at a competition policy for 
Zimbabwe which would have to be served by the proposed Competition Law. When looking 
at competition laws it is essential to draw a broad distinction between two types;
a) those competition laws adopting the "prohibition" principle and
b) those competition laws which adopt the "control of abuse" principle.
The United States anti-trust law regime is the clearest example of a legal regime which 
adopts the "prohibition principle". The prohibition principle defines restrictive business 
practices, the acquisition of a dominant market position and monopoly power and proceeds 
to declare all these practices illegal in that economy.
The control of abuse principle is more tolerant; restrictive business practices and the 
acquisition of monopoly power are tolerated as long as there is instituted a sufficient 
regulatory mechanism to prevent any abuses arising from such dominance, the abuses 
being all the usual negative consequences of a monopoly situation. Most European countries 
including the United Kingdom and Germany adopt this "live on merit" or "control of 
abuse" principle.
It is the author's opinion that the control of abuse principle is more commendable than the 
American anti-trust approach. Monopolies perse are not necessarily undesirable and indeed 
in a developing market economy like ours they might actually be the essential driving 
force needed to render the necessary industrialization and commercialization of our 
economy. It would indeed be folly to ignore, in Zimbabwe's case, the inevitability and to 
some extent the desirability of some monopolies. The control of abuse approach recognizes 
that technological and economic progress might mean larger units and while this obviously 
increases the oligopolistic nature of an economy, it does not prohibit the increase in unit 
sizes of firms as long as the degree of residual competition is within the limits set out in the 
competition law. The only slight disadvantage with this approach is that experience in 
other countries for example Germany, shows that abuse control proceedings tend to be 
resource and time intensive.
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A  superficial glance at the new Competition Act and in particular Part V thereof which 
gives the competition commission the power to authorize certain restrictive practices, 
mergers and other monopolistic practices, confirms that the proposed approach is a basic 
compromise between prohibition and a check on abuses and it should be commended.
A COMPETITION POLICY FOR ZIMBABWE
If competition policy is to be effective in Zimbabwe, it must be clearly defined and 
implemented through a Competition Act. It is folly to start by having a Competition Act 
when there is no consensus on a clearly defined national policy on competition. A national 
competition policy must first appreciate the dangers to effective competition. It must be 
appreciated that both the state and the private sector pose particular dangers to competition. 
As far as the state is concerned, it poses a clear danger whenever it descends with all its 
weight into the market and acts on the same level with private enterprise and discriminates 
between buyers and sellers of goods and services in commerce. In Zimbabwe this is usually 
clear in transactions involving massive army or police acquisitions. This danger is always 
posed when a state abuses a dominant position in commerce. The state as a sovereign can 
also negate competition through the creation of public monopolies, and the granting of 
subsidies to dying industries in order to prop them up, which is in contravention of the 
market forces trying to pull the tied up resources towards more productive uses, and the 
institution of protectionist measures to keep out import competition.
Private sector dangers to competition usually come in the form of cartels that is, agreements 
between competitors not to compete at all or to compete only to a limited extent; and 
agreements to charge uniform prices. Sometimes firms agree that firm A would trade in 
Harare, firm B in Bulawayo and firm C in Mutare. In the first example price competition is 
eliminated and in the second example competition is altogether negated and all in all 
consumers are bound to pay higher prices. Mergers between private firms also reduce 
active participation in the competition process.
It is clear therefore that for effective economic competition to exist there must be a su fficiently 
substantial number of enterprises in the market enjoying the freedom of action to decide 
on basic matters such as quality, quantity and price. The enterprises must have a fair chance 
of making profits and the market structure has to be competitive and there should be realistic 
possibilities of market entry. For Zimbabwe to have a clearly defined competition policy it 
has to address the following five points:
1. Great efforts should be made to explain the market economy and all its essential 
elements to the public at large, the established business community and the emerging 
business community. This is the only way a culture of competition can be established.
2. Through this process of consultation, adequate and practical substantive laws on 
competition have to be formulated. These laws should evolve out of the competition 
policy formulated for the sole purpose of implementing competition.
3. The law should provide the appropriate procedures which provide for swift and 
effective action.
4. There should be provision for a clear institutional framework for the effective 
implementation of rules and procedures.
5. There should always be a structure which ensures that the competition policy is taken 
cognisance of when other government policies are formulated and implemented.
The competition policy which will be formulated will have to be implemented through a 
competition lav/. An effective competition law has certain essential characteristics.
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1. It must be dear in its thrust. Its sole object should be the competition process and 
hence it should clearly and only aim at the promotion and protection of the process of 
competition. It is important to note that some competition laws in other jurisdictions 
have broader agendas than the mere protection of competition. Hungarian anti-trust 
legislation for instance incorporates a price control mechanism and other aspects of 
consumer protection. The international trend, however, dearly is for enacting an 
independent law confined to competition policy and then to amend existing legislation 
accordingly. To broaden the basic agenda of competition law jeopardizes its overall 
effectiveness and increases the risk of external pressure.
The policy as advocated above is however ideal only to a developed market economy. 
Economies in transition, for the simple reason that they are undergoing structural 
changes, need socially acceptable safety devices. Structural Adjustment usually entails 
wholesale abandonment of price controls and subsidies, leading to great social 
suffering. A counter balancing mechanism is therefore needed to ensure that the effects 
of further adjustment ie the creation of competition through the implementation of 
the competition policy, does not cause undue suffering. In these circumstances there 
is need to arm the competition authority with power to take into account the effects 
of prices, labour retention and other consumer interests before making a determination 
of the desirability or otherwise of an economic set up. This however should be viewed 
simply as a transitional safety valve.
2. It must be all embracing. Substantive competition law should apply to both the public 
and the private sector. This is the trend in most developed and developing countries 
including the countries of Eastern Europe. Further, competition law should be 
comprehensive, codified and easily accessible.
3. Competition law should provide for a procedure which is simple, transparent and 
above board. It should provide for clear powers of investigation, enforcement and 
penalties so that the commercial sector has absolute confidence in the competition 
system. There should be a clear right of appeal. Administrative decisions should be 
capable of being challenged firstly by way of review in the High Court and secondly 
by way of appeal on points of law in the Supreme Court. This is important because it 
will lead to the evolution of uniform case law. It will also further enhance the business 
community's confidence in the competition system because the Zimbabwean judicial 
system is still highly regarded for its competence and professionalism.
4. Competition law should provide for an independent competition authority. This is 
absolutely essential if people are to have confidence in the system at all. The business 
sector and the public have to be sure that the competition authority implements 
competition policy without fear or favour. The independence of the authority should 
relate both to its status as an entity (it should not be a state department) and to the 
people who serve on it. People should be appointed to the authority purely on 
professional grounds; they have to be highly qualified, well remunerated; they should 
be appointed for fixed terms and sh'ould only be dismissed under very strict conditions 
by formal public proceedings. Further, the back up staff should be extremely qualified.
5. Competition law should mandate the competition authority with an obligation to 
advocate competition policy nationally.
COMPETITION LAW AND LABOUR
Competition law marks the very essence of capitalist economies and Trade Unions operating
in these circumstances have to be clear as to what broad perspectives to take. Under market
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economies, workers have two main areas of concentration, namely maximum protection 
in terms of improved working conditions and enhanced job security. There is also an interest in 
job  creation.
Trade Unions do better under capitalist economies by doing everything to enhance the 
power of workers, particularly organised labour, while at the same time weakening the 
power of capital. Accordingly, any analysis of competition law by Trade Unions must have 
regard to inter alia, the following four questions:
1 How does this impact on existing working conditions?
2 Does it enhance or weaken job security?
3 Does it promote the concentration of capital (e.g. with monopolies)?
4 What is its impact on organised labour?
These questions will be examined in different contexts as we analyse the provisions of the 
Act below.
EXAMINATION OF THE ACT IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE
It is proposed to proceed by examining selected sections individually and progressively. 
Section 2 Interpretation
The section endeavours to define important concepts in this area such as "controlling 
interest" "restrictive practice" "monopoly" "merger" and "substantial market control". 
While this attempt is totally commendable the result is however inadequate. The definitions 
are not precise. In practice what the monopoly commission will need are concrete guidelines 
to work on, for instance, it should be clearly ascertainable from just flipping through policy 
guidelines that a dominant market position entails 60% control of the market or some such 
other concrete guideline. The Act Against Restraints of Competition (ARC) of Germany of 
July 271957 as promulgated on September 24 1980, for example, provides clearer concrete 
guidelines to these concepts and should be used as a basic model. There should be clear 
guidelines on meiger control procedures and this would be particularly helpful for the 
commission when it executes its duties under either Part IV or Part V of the Act.
Section 3 (Application of Act)
Section 3 (b) states that the Competition Act shall not be construed so as to prevent 'trade 
unions or other representatives of employees from protecting their members' interests by 
negotiating and concluding agreements and other arrangements with employers or 
representatives of employers in terms of the Labour Relations 1985 (No. 16 of 1985). The 
interpretation of "restrictive practice" under section 2 of the Act relates inter alia to acts 
which have the following effects; •
(i) restricting the production or distribution of any commodity or service.
(ii) preventing the production or distribution of any commodity or service by the most 
efficient or economical means.
(iii) preventing or retarding the development or introduction of technical improvements 
in regard to any commodity or service.
Assuming a trade union acting in its member's interest engaged in measures which have 
these restrictive effects (e.g labour boycotts, slow down, strikes) it will face difficulties not 
only under the Labour Relations Act but also under the Competition Act. In my opinion
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this is undesirable. There is already sufficient legislation which fetters the freedom of the 
labour movement and we do not need any more. Subsection 3 1(b) should be amended so 
that it reads "The Competition Act shall not apply to Trade Unions".
The definition of a restrictive practice in section 2 of the Act is so wide as to cover important 
aspects of the power of organised labour, for instance, any form of collective job action as 
defined in the Labour Relations Act, 1985 will fall within the ambit of a restrictive practice. 
Further, the all important area of collective bargaining will be seriously jeopardised. 
Collective bargaining agreements providing very good working conditions may be seen 
as restrictive practices if they are conceived as curtailing the power of the employer to 
vary working conditions downwards.
It is therefore important that the whole Act be made inapplicable to Trade Unions, 
howsoever defined.
Section 3(3)
It is advisable to clarify the extent to which the state can be civilly liable. Aspects of 
enforcement of orders and state immunity have got to be harmonized if this subsection is 
to have any practical significance. There exist stringent restrictions to the enforcement of 
civil judgements against the state which are imposed by the State Liabilities Act. Hence 
related legislation would have to be amended to provide clarity in this area of law.
PART II COMPETITION COMMISSION 
Section 4
This provides for the creation of an independent competition commission and is therefore 
to be highly commended. It is an improvement on commissions in other jurisdictions which 
are either a government department on their own or are in the Attorney General's offices 
because such commissions lack transparency and autonomy and are susceptible to political 
pressure.
Section 5
The Act should establish as one of the basic objects of the commission the active propagation 
of the national competition policy to the public and the commercial sector. There is need 
for public education in this field and the commission should be tasked with the obligation 
of spearheading this thrust.
Sections 6~12 
Broad observations:
t
(a) These sections give the state President the power to appoint members to the 
commission at his sole discretion. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the commission 
will also be appointed by the President. This is a bit contradictory because the objective 
of section 4 is the creation of the commission as an independent body. It is clear 
however that the independence of the commission will be greatly compromised given 
the appointment mechanism provided for. In interviews conducted during the course 
of this research it became quite clear that both the labour movement and commercial 
concerns would be happier with a situation where the President makes his 
appointments from lists submitted by organized industry, commerce, the professions,
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the consumer council and other institutions which may be appropriate. In the United 
States members of the opposition are also appointed to such commissions. It is also 
important that once the members of the commission have been appointed they should 
be given the power to elect their Chairman and Vice-Chairman. Members of the 
commission should also only be removed through formal open proceedings.
Section 7 (c) In Particular
(b) By virtue of the nature of the mandate of the commission, members of the commission 
are likely to be exposed to various temptations as certain sectors of the economy 
endeavour to avoid the commission's scrutiny. To that extent the moral calibre of 
appointees to the commission becomes extremely crucial. To my mind people 
appointed to this commission should be people who have, in their professional or 
private lives, exhibited conduct which is beyond reproach. It is my opinion therefore 
that once a person has been convicted of a crime involving fraud or dishonesty the 
person automatically ceases to possess those qualities expected of a member of such 
a commission. The issue of the penalty imposed on the person, let alone, whether or 
not he is subsequently pardoned by the President, is irrelevant.
It is clear in terms of section 27 (1) (d) that existing monopolies are covered and may have 
their monopoly status terminated by the commission. For labour, a difficulty which arises 
is the status of workers employed by the monopoly. This is where the concern with job 
security arises. The section has to be clear as to what happens to workers if a monopoly 
has been brought to an end. Is this retrenchment for purposes of retrenchment regulations 
in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1985 or is it mere termination of employment? These 
issues are not clear and have to be clarified as it is important for workers to be protected, 
by being given the right of first refusal in any new businesses taking over broken 
monopolies, or by the consultation of Trade Unions where existing monopolies are to be 
broken up.
Section 13 (V  of the Act stipulates that the minimum number of meetings the commission 
can have within each financial year is six meetings. Given the wide range of obligations 
the commission is mandated to effect under Part IV and V of the Act, the minimum number 
of mandatory meetings is hardly satisfactory. The commission will have to be obligated to 
meet much more frequently and it would have to be serviced by a professional full time 
secretariat if it is to discharge its obligations well.
Section 16 (3)
Failure to disclose secret beneficial associations and interests under section 16(1) and (2) is 
tantamount to the commission of a crime of dishonesty and, given the need for members 
to have unquestionable integrity as discussed above, section 16(3) should provide for the 
automatic removal of such a person from 'the commission. The Act only provides for the 
removal of a member of the commission only if he has been convicted of an offence of 
fraud or dishonesty and sentenced to a term of imprisonment imposed without the option 
of a fine.
Section 17
The appointment of Director of the commission is provided for under section 17. The Act 
however does not expressly stipulate the Director's powers and functions. The Director,
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for instance, cannot on his own initiative undertake investigations without the authority 
delegating to him the power to initiate such a procedure. This weakens the effectiveness of 
the commission given the fact that it does not meet continuously. It is my submission 
therefore that the Act should clearly designate the powers of the Director to deal with 
routine matters so that the commission only concentrates on important matters of mergers 
and monopoly dominance.
Section 27 and 28
This section provides for the publication in the Government Gazette and a local newspaper 
of the commission's intention to undertake an investigation into restrictive practices, 
mergers and monopoly situations. The principle here is honourable because the greater 
the publicity the more chances there are of interested people getting notice to make written 
representations to the commission. In interviews conducted during the course of this 
research with the business sector, however, it was clear that the commercial sector has 
some reservations on this point. The main fear is that the publication of names of companies 
to be investigated exposes those companies to undue scrutiny and they may even suffer 
boycotts and lose business. A balance can be struck if the commission first carries out a 
discreet investigation to establish a prima facie case, and only after a prima facie case has 
been established should the commission resort to publication. Further, the commission 
should make greater use of section 29 which deals with negotiations and applications for 
authorization before resorting to either section 27 or 28.
Under section 28 the commission can prohibit certain economic activities pending 
investigation. This basically grants the commission power to issue provisional injunctions. 
It is important to note that such an order can cause severe prejudice not only to the proprietor 
of the affected firm, in terms of loss of production, but can also result in retrenchments and 
loss of livelihood. Two options can be pursued to alleviate this;
1. If there is unlikely to be severe prejudice to concerned parties it would be advisable to 
provide for production to continue while investigations are in progress and;
2. Even if the prejudice is likely to be severe, there is a need to shorten the time period 
within which the commission should complete its investigations while production is 
frozen. A possible period of one year pending investigations as stated in the Act is too 
long. Further, the question of who bears the prejudice occasioned to innocent parties 
during the period of investigation when economic activities are suspended should be 
addressed and a compensatory fund should be established for such purposes.
Section 30 and 31 Factors to be Considered By The Commission When Making 
Orders
Subsection 30 (1) (d) gives the commission power to regulate the price which any person 
named in an order by the commission can charge for any commodity or service. The 
definition of public interest in this section incorporates under section 31 (b) "promoting 
the interests of consumers, purchasers and other users of commodities and services in 
Zimbabwe, in regard to the prices, quality and variety of such commodities— " e.t.c. This 
provision has been criticized by the Zimbabwean business sector on the basi s that if a price 
control regime is to be maintained it should be dealt with by one authority only; the Ministry 
which implements the Control of Goods Act. The argument advocated is that if the 
commission is to make decisions on price control then it should just make recommendations 
to the concerned ministty and the determination on prices should affect the entire industry.
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The thrust should not be to control prices on the basis of information gathered during an 
examination of one company. The flipside to this argument is that in an economy in 
transition, competition policy should encompass social safeguards. Indeed in Zimbabwe 
the thrust all along has been to do away with price controls and they now hardly exist. To 
that extent the public interest in price control and retention of labour as provided under 
section 30(1) (d) should be important considerations when the commission makes its 
determinations. There should still be a way of regulating these socially important factors 
and the discretionary powers given to the commission have such an effect. A compromise 
has to be made. The competition commission has to have social obligations. Any 
determination it makes should take into full cognisance repercussions on price levels and 
labour retention. However, if the commission adopts a policy on these aspects the 
implementation of that policy should fall on another independent body which has as its 
main task the regulation of those aspects. It is quite contradictory to create on the one hand 
a body which should champion competition and on the other hand task the same body 
with powers which in effect lead to a distortion of competition, and a price and quality 
control regime has such a distorting effect. In both sections 30 and 31, there is no clear 
reference to the consideration of workers' interests when an order to terminate a monopoly 
is made.
Section 30 (3)(a): This provides that an order by the commission may provide for "the transfer 
or vesting of property rights, liabilities or obligations". It should be noted that private 
property is constitutionally protected. Further Section 30 (3)(a) should provide for more 
detailed safeguards to maintain the equities of the situation, for example the provision of 
compensation.
PART VI APPEALS
Section 39(1) of the Act grants the high court the power to hear appeals from the commission 
and to confirm, vary, reverse or set aside the decision which is the subject of the appeal or 
refer the matter back to the commission for further consideration. Given the pressures on 
the existing judiciary machinery and the current lack of expertise on the part of the legal 
profession on competition policies, it might be better to establish a separate machinery 
which deals exclusively with competition issues. In Germany, for example, the Act Against 
Restraints on Competition provides for the federal cartel office which operates just like a 
court. Decisions are made by a panel of three experts in competition law and they handle 
both administrative and quasi-criminal cases. The office has sweeping investigatory powers. 
Zimbabwe needs such a mechanism to ensure swift determination of cases from the 
commission. The commission itself should have power to grant temporary relief only and 
refer cases to this institution for confirmation. However, the High Court will retain the 
power to review decisions from such an institution and parties can refer disputes as to 
questions of law to the Supreme Court for final determination. Section 32 (Enforcement of 
orders) will therefore apply to confirmed orders. This will have the effect of reducing the 
number of cases which will be referred to the High Court and the Supreme Court since 
obvious errors by the commission will be detected at the confirmation stage.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations have already been discussed in more detail within the 
body of the critique itself. They are however, summarized here for convenience of reference.
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(1) There is a need for national debate to map out a national competition policy. All 
interested groups should be encouraged to take part in the seminars and discussion 
groups. The public in general should also be educated on the implications of 
competition and a competition policy. This is essential because unless there is a 
consensus on a competition policy it will always be difficult to have a "magna carta" 
of competition law which will serve effectively the various interest groups. Ideally, 
competition law should be there to implement a clearly defined competition policy. 
Further, for competition law to be successful it has to be accepted and for it to be 
accepted people should be part and parcel of its formulation.
(2) Section 2, the interpretation clause tries to define essential concepts such as "controlling 
interest", "monopoly situation" "restrictive practice" and "substantial market control". 
While this is commendable there is a need for more concrete guidelines in the definition 
of such terms. There is a need to agree on guidelines for instance on what "substantial 
market control" is and the thrust here should be on fixing definite percentages. The 
German Act Against Restraints of Competition (ARC) lays down basic concrete 
guidelines and should serve as a model in this area. Interested parties should therefore 
be invited to agree on a checklist for merger control procedures and this checklist 
should appear as a schedule to the Act. At the moment it is vague and the commission 
has too wide a discretion.
Section 3: Section 3 1(b) should be amended so that it states that the Competition Act shall
not regulate Trade Unions.
(3) Section 5: Functions of Commission: It should be clearly stated that one of the functions 
of the commission is to publicize the national competition policy and engage in mass 
education of the general populace in this regard.
(4) Membership of Commission (Section 6)
This section should be amended so that it provides for the President to appoint 
members to the commission from lists submitted to him through the Minister of Trade 
and Commerce by various interest groups e.g the Trade Unions, Commerce, the 
Professions, the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe and other interest groups. This is 
essential if the autonomy of the commission is to be credible. This amendment should 
also apply to the filling of vacancies on the commission.
(5) Disqualification For Appointment As Member Section 7
Sub Section 7(c) should be amended so that it provides for the disqualification of anyone 
who has been convicted of an offense involving fraud or dishonesty irrespective of 
whether or not he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a 
fine. Section 8 should be amended so that it provides for the removal of members 
from the commission only after formal public proceedings.
6. Section 12: Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Commission
This should be amended to provide for appointed members of the commission to 
elect their own chairman and vice-chairman.
7. Section 13: Meetings and Procedure of Commission
Sub Section 13(1) should be amended to increase the number of mandatory meetings 
from six times in a financial year to at least ten times.
8. Section  16: M em bers of Com m ission and Com m ittees to D isclose Certain 
Connections and Interests
Subsection 16 (3) should be amended so that it provides that anyone who contravenes 
section 16 shall be guilty of an offence of dishonesty and shall be automatically 
disqualified from continuing to serve as a member of the commission.
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9. Section 17: Appointment and Functions of Director of Commission
The Director should be given specific power under this section to initiate investigations 
into routine issues. Substantive investigations into mergers, takeovers and monopolies 
should however remain the exclusive domain of the commission.
10. Section 27: Power of Commission to Investigate
This section makes it mandatory for the commission to publish in a local newspaper 
and the Gazette its intention to investigate a particular company. The section should 
be amended so that it obliges the commission to first investigate discreetly and only 
in those cases where it establishes a prima facie case should it proceed to publication.
Section 28: Prohibition of Certain Acts Pending Investigation
This section should be amended so that it provides for the prohibition of activities only in 
those extreme cases where it is deemed that irreparable prejudice will be occasioned by 
continued economic activity while investigations are in progress.
There should also be provision for a reserve fund which will address the issue of prejudice 
suffered during the period when there is no production should a concerned party be 
exonerated at the conclusion of investigations.
Further the commission should be obliged to submit the report on its investigation at the 
latest after six months and not after a year (for purposes of minimizing prejudice).
Sections 30 and 31: Regulation of Prices: Definition of “Public Interest”
The definition of Public Appeal under section 31 should be retained and the desirability of 
taking into account the likely effect of a restrictive practice, merger or monopoly situation 
on the level of prices and employment should be emphasised. Section 30 (1) (d) which 
gives the commission power to regulate the price charged by an entity is however 
undesirable and should be repealed. In circumstances where the commission feels that 
prices have to be regulated it should forward such a recommendation to a different price 
control machinery which has the responsibility of practically regulating prices across the 
board.
Section 30 (3)(a) should be reviewed in light of the constitutional protection of private 
property. In particular it should provide for a compensatory fund.
Section 39 Appeals
There should be provision for a specialist institution such as the cartel office in Germany 
or the office of Fair Trading in England which would hear cases referred to it by the 
commission. A right of review would lie to the High Court and aggrieved parties could 
still appeal to the Supreme Court on questions of law only. The commission itself should 
have power only to grant provisional relief. Section 32 (Enforcement of Orders) should 
therefore apply to orders confirmed by the specialist institution.
AGENDA
(1) There is need to publicize the Competition Act through seminars and publications to 
ensure that our concerns are incorporated before its enactment.
(2) A more thorough comparative study of competition laws in Kenya, South Africa and 
perhaps Germany is essential in order to assess the effectiveness of competition laws 
on the ground.
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Interviews Conducted Jnt
1. Mr E. Moyo, Fredrick Neuman Foundation. nd
2. Mr Foroma, Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries.
3. Mr M. Tsvangirai, Mr Mudzengerere, Dr Kanyenze, Zimbabwe Congress of Trade t
Unions.
4. Mr Tshabangu, Deputy Secretary Ministry of Trade and Commerce.
5. Mr D. Ruhukwa, Mr T. Zizhou, Civil Division of the Attorney General's Office.
Comparative Work
1. Hungarian and Polish anti-trust legislation.
2. German Act against Restraint of Trade (it was hoped to also compare Kenyan and 
South African legislation in greater detail).
3. UK: The Fair Trading Act of 1993.
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